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Algeria
DZschema crypto-v2.0.0trajectory: not yet assessedprohibitedoverlaps: FIM
Last updated · 8 categories · 9 sourced
findings · 11 sources in the cumulative register
8Categoriesbaseline.
9Findings.claims[]
5Tier-1 sourcesrun_metadata.t1_source_count
Confidence mix(sums to 8 rendered categories; click to filter)
No categories moved this cycle.
Jurisdiction lead brief
Lead Signal
Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025 imposes a comprehensive criminal prohibition on crypto-asset activity in Algeria, replacing the earlier, more loosely-enforced ban under the 2018 Financial Law. The statute criminalises the issuance, purchase, sale, possession, use and promotion of crypto-assets outright, held at High confidence though no Tier-1 primary source (the Official Journal or joradp.dz) was reached this cycle to verify the exact statutory text. This is a structural, architecture-level shift in Algeria's crypto posture rather than a single enforcement episode: it forecloses any classification regime, any licensing pathway, and any lawful on-chain activity in one statutory move.
Other Developments
No classification taxonomy survives the ban. Because the prohibition is total, Algeria's crypto-asset classification regime is, in effect, non-existent: all categories of crypto-asset, including stablecoins, fall undifferentiated under the blanket criminal prohibition, with no token-type distinctions operative in law.
Mining explicitly targeted, with field enforcement reported. Law No. 25-10 separately and explicitly bans crypto mining, with enforcement reportedly including inspections triggered by anomalous electricity-consumption increases and reported equipment seizures. This provision is linked in secondary reporting to strain on the national power grid, giving the mining-specific ban an energy-policy rationale distinct from the general AML/CFT rationale attached to the rest of the statute.
Cross-border access closed via VPN enforcement. The law's enforcement reach extends to VPN use, closing the access channel previously used to reach offshore crypto exchanges. This operates as a de facto outbound-access restriction rather than a formal cross-border transfer-reporting regime — there is no reporting mechanism to describe, because the underlying activity is criminalised rather than permitted-and-monitored.
Cross-Monitor Connections
This cycle's crypto prohibition is explicitly the same statute financial-integrity tracks as an AML/CFT-architecture amendment (Law No. 25-10 amends and supplements Law No. 05-01 directly), and it is the mechanism a separately-reported gambling-sector enforcement action relied upon: a network of local agents in Béjaïa was reportedly dismantled for processing cryptocurrency payments in support of illegal online gambling. The crypto and gambling regulatory tracks in Algeria are therefore structurally linked through this single statute, even though this monitor does not itself analyse the gambling-sector implications.
Outlook
Watch for whether a Tier-1 primary source (Bank of Algeria or Official Journal) becomes reachable to verify Article 6a's exact text, and whether enforcement activity — mining-equipment seizures, VPN-access prosecutions, or payment-facilitation cases beyond the single reported Béjaïa network — expands in subsequent cycles, which would confirm the prohibition is being operationalised at scale rather than existing primarily as statute.
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Algeria does not operate a positive licensing, registration, or notification regime for crypto-asset activity. Instead, Algeria's 2018 Finance Law (Loi n°17-11 du 27 décembre 2017 portant loi de finances pour 2018) is understood to prohibit the purchase, sale, use, and holding of 'monnaie virtuelle' (virtual currency), placing crypto-asset commercial activity outside any lawful licensing pathway. No subsequent Bank of Algeria (Banque d'Algérie) circular has been identified establishing a VASP authorisation track, and no draft bill liberalising the sector has surfaced in primary-source searches as of this run. Because the primary Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne (JORA) text of the specific prohibiting article could not be directly retrieved and verified in this research pass, the precise article citation is held at Probable confidence pending primary-source confirmation.
Standing sub-brief201 words · last cycle 2026-09-14
Crypto Licensing
Algeria has no crypto-asset licensing regime because Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025 criminalises the issuance, purchase, sale, possession, use and promotion of crypto-assets outright, superseding the earlier and more loosely-enforced prohibition under the 2018 Financial Law. This is held at High confidence, though the finding rests on Tier-3 secondary reporting rather than a directly-reached Tier-1 source such as the Official Journal or a Bank of Algeria publication. The Bank of Algeria and the Banking Commission are identified as the relevant supervisory authorities, though their role under a total prohibition is enforcement-adjacent rather than licensing-adjacent, since there is no licensable activity to authorise.
This is an architecture-level posture, not an incident: the statute forecloses the entire category of lawful crypto-asset business in Algeria in one legislative act, rather than resolving a single enforcement matter. The traffic-light status for this module is red, reflecting a total criminal prohibition that is actively enforced, evidenced by reported equipment seizures connected to the related mining ban.
Outlook
Watch for any Tier-1 confirmation of the statute's exact text and for whether any narrow exemption (for example, for research or educational use) is later clarified, since current secondary sourcing does not resolve this question.
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-22
Crypto Licensing
Algeria's crypto licensing landscape is defined by absence: Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025 imposes a blanket criminal prohibition on issuance, purchase, sale, use, possession, trading, promotion, and the operation of exchanges or wallet platforms for virtual assets. There is no licensing pathway of any kind, contemplated or otherwise -- the law does not carve out a registration or authorisation regime for any category of crypto business; it simply criminalises the activity outright. This places Algeria at the most restrictive end of the global regulatory spectrum, alongside jurisdictions that have chosen prohibition over even a minimal registration framework.
Secondary commentary describes penalties in the range of roughly two months to one year of imprisonment, plus fines of 200,000 to 1,000,000 DZD, though the exact figures vary slightly across sources and have not been reconciled against a primary legal text this cycle. This uncertainty is a sourcing gap rather than a substantive ambiguity in the law's prohibitory character, which is consistently and probably confirmed across the available secondary sources.
The supervisory authority nominally associated with this space is the Bank of Algeria, though its role here is one of prohibition-enforcement rather than licensing administration, since there is no licence to administer. This is consistent with the broader pattern in Algeria's approach to novel financial technologies: rather than building a bespoke regulatory perimeter, the state has opted to criminalise the underlying activity entirely.
Outlook
No development this cycle suggests any movement toward a licensing pathway. The regulatory horizon carries no entries for Algeria on crypto licensing, and the trajectory recorded by the interpreter is stable at the most restrictive end of the scale. The principal open question -- reconciliation of the exact penalty schedule against primary legislative text -- remains unresolved and would require direct access to the Journal Officiel text of Law 25-10 to settle.
1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.
Sources and findings (2)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — Algeria's 2018 Finance Law prohibits the purchase, sale, use, and holding of virtual currency (monnaie virtuelle), placing commercial crypto-asset activity outside any lawful license or registration track.retrieved M5bindingin force
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — No licensing, registration, or notification regime exists for virtual asset service providers in Algeria; the Bank of Algeria has not published any VASP authorisation framework.retrieved M5bindingin force
Algeria has no positive legal taxonomy distinguishing security tokens, e-money tokens, asset-referenced tokens, utility tokens, stablecoins, or NFTs. The 2018 Finance Law's 'monnaie virtuelle' definition is understood to apply broadly to crypto-assets used as a means of exchange without an issuer-recognition test, effectively foreclosing the need for (and existence of) a classification regime. This module is emitted with an explicit jurisdiction-has-no-analog rationale.
Standing sub-brief170 words · last cycle 2026-08-21
Token Classification
No token classification taxonomy operates in Algeria: because Law No. 25-10 imposes a blanket criminal prohibition on crypto-asset activity, all crypto-asset types, including stablecoins, fall undifferentiated under that prohibition. This is held at High confidence from Tier-4 secondary sourcing. There is accordingly no utility-token, security-token, payment-token, or stablecoin-specific classification distinction operative in Algerian law — the absolute nature of the ban precludes the need for, and the existence of, any such framework.
This absence of classification is itself the material finding for this module: in jurisdictions with partial or permissive crypto regimes, token classification typically determines the regulatory pathway (securities-style oversight, payment-instrument oversight, or unregulated status); Algeria's total prohibition removes that determination entirely by foreclosing all pathways at once. The traffic-light status is red, consistent with the prohibition regime.
Outlook
Watch for whether any future amendment introduces even a narrow classification carve-out (for example, for central-bank-issued digital currency, which would sit outside a private crypto-asset prohibition by definition); no such signal exists in the evidence reaching this cycle.
No new data since the standing brief. 1 periodic run re-emitted it unchanged.
Sources and findings (1)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — Algeria maintains no statutory taxonomy differentiating token categories (security/utility/stablecoin/NFT); the 2018 ban treats virtual currency as a single undifferentiated prohibited category.retrieved M3non-bindinga fact about the regime
No legal framework authorises or governs staking, DeFi lending, DEX operation, mining, node operation, validator activity, or tokenization in Algeria. Given the blanket 2018 prohibition on virtual-currency use, on-chain activity of any commercial character falls outside any lawful operating basis. This module is emitted as jurisdiction-has-no-analog.
Standing sub-brief196 words · last cycle 2026-09-14
On-Chain Activity Regime
Law No. 25-10 explicitly and separately bans crypto mining in Algeria, with reported enforcement including inspections triggered by anomalous electricity-consumption increases and reported equipment seizures. This is held at Assessed confidence from Tier-4 secondary sourcing. Secondary reporting links the mining-specific provision to strain on the national power grid, giving this element of the statute an energy-policy rationale that is analytically distinct from the AML/CFT rationale underpinning the broader crypto-asset prohibition, even though both sit within the same statute.
The active field-enforcement dimension — anomalous-consumption-triggered inspections and equipment seizures — is a notable departure from a purely paper prohibition: it indicates Algerian authorities have operationalised at least one detection mechanism (utility-consumption monitoring) specifically targeted at on-chain mining activity, rather than relying solely on ex-post prosecution. The Bank of Algeria is named as a supervisory authority, with national utility and judicial authorities also identified as enforcement participants for this specific provision. The traffic-light status is red, with the rationale explicitly citing active field enforcement.
Outlook
Watch for further reported equipment-seizure activity or utility-consumption-monitoring detail, which would corroborate whether this detection mechanism is being applied at meaningful scale across the country rather than in isolated cases.
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-22
On-Chain Activity Regime
Algeria's on-chain activity regime is governed by the same blanket prohibition that defines its licensing posture: Law No. 25-10 criminalises cryptocurrency mining explicitly and separately from other virtual-asset activities, closing a gap that had been left open by the 2018 Finance Law. Prior to this law, mining activity existed in a grey zone -- neither expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited -- and the 2025 legislation resolves that ambiguity decisively in the direction of prohibition rather than accommodation.
This is a probable-confidence finding, corroborated by industry commentary describing the law's scope, though the underlying evidence base for this cycle rests on secondary sources (an industry stablecoin-regulation reference site) rather than a directly retrieved primary statutory text. The naming of mining as a distinct, expressly criminalised activity -- rather than leaving it to be swept up under a general prohibition on "use" or "possession" -- suggests the legislature specifically intended to close the loophole that had allowed mining activity to proceed under the prior 2018 framework's silence.
No on-chain activity of any kind -- whether mining, staking, DeFi participation, or wallet operation -- has a lawful basis in Algeria under the current regime. This is a uniform prohibition rather than a tiered or activity-specific framework.
Outlook
The trajectory for on-chain activity regulation in Algeria is stable at maximal restriction, with no regulatory horizon entries suggesting reconsideration. Any change to this picture would require either a legislative amendment reopening space for mining or other on-chain activity, or clarifying guidance narrowing the scope of Article 6 bis -- neither of which is indicated by any source available this cycle.
1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.
Sources and findings (1)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — No specific legal or regulatory framework exists in Algeria authorising or governing crypto-asset mining, staking, validation, or DeFi activity; such activity is not addressed as a distinct regulatory category outside the general virtual-currency prohibition.retrieved M2non-bindinga fact about the regime
Algeria has no stablecoin-specific issuance authorisation, reserve, redemption, disclosure, or systemic-designation regime. Stablecoins fall within the general 'monnaie virtuelle' prohibition rather than being addressed as a distinct regulatory category. This module is emitted as jurisdiction-has-no-analog.
Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.
no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief
Sources and findings (1)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — Algeria has not established any stablecoin issuance-authorisation, reserve, or redemption-right regime; stablecoins are not distinguished from other virtual currencies under the 2018 prohibition.retrieved M3non-bindinga fact about the regime
No crypto-specific consumer-protection regime (marketing restriction, risk disclosure, custody segregation, complaint handling, suitability) has been identified for Algeria; the sector's blanket prohibition removes the predicate for a bespoke consumer-protection track, and general consumer-protection statutes have not been shown to extend to crypto-asset dealings in the sources reviewed. Module emitted as jurisdiction-has-no-analog.
Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.
no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief
Sources and findings (1)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — No Algeria-specific crypto consumer-protection regime (disclosure, custody segregation, complaint handling, suitability) has been identified; the blanket prohibition on virtual currency forecloses a bespoke protective framework.retrieved M3non-bindinga fact about the regime
No crypto-specific tax treatment (capital gains, income tax, VAT/GST, withholding, reporting obligation) has been identified for Algeria, consistent with the general prohibition on virtual-currency dealing. Module emitted as jurisdiction-has-no-analog.
Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.
no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief
Sources and findings (1)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — Algeria has not published a crypto-specific tax code (capital gains, income tax, VAT/GST, withholding, or reporting obligation); the general virtual-currency prohibition leaves no lawful predicate transaction to tax.retrieved M2non-bindinga fact about the regime
Algeria maintains stringent general foreign-exchange controls administered by the Banque d'Algérie, and the 2018 Finance Law's virtual-currency prohibition is understood to extend to cross-border crypto-asset flows, which would in any event fall foul of exchange-control rules. Algeria's continued presence on the FATF increased-monitoring ('grey') list since October 2024, with enhanced follow-up ongoing through the February 2026 plenary, heightens scrutiny of cross-border value transfer generally, including any virtual-asset channel, though no virtual-asset-specific travel-rule or reporting-threshold regime has been identified.
Standing sub-brief213 words · last cycle 2026-09-14
Cross-Border Transfer
Algeria has no formal cross-border crypto-asset transfer or reporting regime; instead, Law No. 25-10 extends the country's crypto prohibition into cross-border access itself by criminalising VPN use, closing the specific channel previously used to reach offshore crypto exchanges. This is held at Assessed confidence from a Tier-3 source. The mechanism functions as a de facto outbound-access restriction rather than a transfer-reporting framework: there is no permitted cross-border crypto transfer activity to report on, because the underlying activity — accessing an offshore exchange at all — is itself criminalised via the VPN provision.
The Bank of Algeria and judicial authorities are identified as enforcement participants for this provision. This is a structurally significant design choice worth naming directly: rather than regulating cross-border crypto transfers (as a jurisdiction with a permissive or partial regime might), Algeria has closed the access route that would make such transfers possible in the first place, converting a transfer-regulation question into an access-prohibition question. The traffic-light status is red, with the rationale citing this as a de facto outbound restriction achieved through VPN-enforcement targeting.
Outlook
Watch for whether VPN-related prosecutions specifically tied to crypto-exchange access are reported in subsequent cycles, which would corroborate that this access-closure mechanism is being actively applied rather than existing only as statutory language.
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-22
Cross-Border Transfer
Cross-border access to crypto services from Algeria has been directly targeted by Law No. 25-10, which criminalises the use of a VPN to bypass state blocking and reach foreign crypto exchanges. This provision closes what had been the principal practical channel through which Algerian users accessed offshore platforms such as Binance, OKX, and Bybit despite the underlying domestic prohibition on crypto activity. Where the blanket prohibition addresses the substantive legality of crypto activity, this provision addresses the practical mechanics of access -- and by criminalising the circumvention tool itself, the state has closed the gap between a law on paper and a law that is actually enforceable against cross-border access attempts.
This is an uncertain-confidence finding, reflecting reliance on Tier-4 secondary sourcing (a gambling-regulation aggregator site) for a claim that properly belongs to the crypto cross-border domain; no primary Journal Officiel text was retrieved this cycle to confirm the precise statutory language of the VPN-circumvention provision as it applies to crypto access specifically (as distinct from its application to gambling access, which carries separate but parallel treatment in other monitors' coverage of the same instrument).
The practical effect, taken together with the underlying blanket prohibition, is that Algeria has closed both the substantive and the access dimensions of cross-border crypto activity in the same legislative act.
Outlook
No regulatory horizon entries point toward any loosening of cross-border access restrictions. The open question for this domain is whether Bank of Algeria FIU/CTRF has issued or will issue implementing guidance under Article 6 bis beyond Instruction 06-2025, which would clarify enforcement mechanics for cross-border transfer attempts specifically, as distinct from the general prohibition.
1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.
Sources and findings (2)
T3 · Council of the European Union / European CommissionCouncil of the European Union / European Commission — Algeria's general foreign-exchange control regime, combined with the 2018 virtual-currency prohibition, forecloses lawful outbound or inbound crypto-asset transfer by residents.retrieved M4bindingin force
T1 · FATFFATF — Algeria has been subject to FATF increased monitoring since October 2024 following its 2023 Mutual Evaluation Report, with the February 2026 FATF plenary preliminarily finding Algeria had largely completed its action plan pending an on-site confirmation visit.retrieved M4bindingin force
AML/CFT is a Financial Integrity Module (FIM) subscription for the crypto consumer; this baseline does not emit aml_cft claims. For disambiguation context only: Algeria was placed under FATF increased monitoring ('grey list') in October 2024 following its 2023 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation Report, and remains in enhanced follow-up; the February 2026 FATF plenary preliminarily concluded Algeria had largely completed its action plan, with an on-site visit contemplated to confirm implementation. No virtual-asset-specific AML supervisory measures (e.g., a VASP registration/travel-rule regime) were identified as part of Algeria's AML/CFT framework in the sources reviewed.
Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.
no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief
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Publication gate
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tier_a_b_national_primary_pct
83.33
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0
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Editorial metadata
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Editorial metadata for Algeria
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